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Governing India:
What do we know and need to 
know?
Rahul Mukherji
This paper is part of the Heidelberg Inaugural Lecture delivered in the Alte 
Aula on 15 November 2017, and of a public lecture delivered at the centre 
for Economic and Social Sciences in Hyderabad. It presents a view regard-
ing state capacity in India after discussing the extensive literature on clien-
telism. It proposes that state capacity in India has much to do with the way 
in which the central and sub-national states cogitate about policy goals and 
the means to achieve them. For example, is import substitution or export 
promotion the way to grow? Will growth trickle down to the poor or is non-
market re-distribution the way to alleviate poverty? These issues are debat-
ed between puzzling bureaucrats and powering politicians, and when they 
reach a tipping point, we see that the state finds capacity to deliver even in 
a liberal democracy like India. The paper proposes a tipping point model for 
understanding state capacity in the Indian liberal democracy. It suggests a 
way for liberal democracies to fight clientelism and develop the capacity to 
pursue their goals, even though these goals are often unrealized.
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Introduction
Seventy years of political independence is an opportune moment for reflect-
ing on how India governs its growth and citizen well-being. The substantive 
part of India’s democracy is ridden with many challenges. First, India’s di-
versity had puzzled social scientists. How could a single state live with such 
diversity in language, religion, cultural and economic attributes (Harrison 
1960)? How could democracy emerge without a substantial bourgeoisie 
(Moore 1966)? How could a nascent and underdeveloped state serve rising 
citizen aspirations due to industrialization, urbanization and modernization 
(Huntington 1968)? Second, India’s democracy was often characterized as 
procedural rather than being a substantive one. Citizens voted, the military 
never came to power, and yet poverty and deprivation were rampant. Schol-
ars addressed this puzzle by suggesting that India is a clientelistic democracy 
where political parties purchase votes in return for particularistic privileges 
rather than seeking to benefit the citizenry at large (Piliavski 2014, Chandra 
2004, Witsoe 2013, Vaishnav 2017). Does India’s liberal democracy, amidst 
unprecedented diversity, and rampant clientelism possess the capacity to 
serve the citizen and play a responsible role in the world?
We review the literature on clientelism. It reveals why India is unable to 
grow more rapidly and serve its citizens with greater ease. This literature is 
significant for explaining India’s failures in governing both economic growth 
and citizen well-being (Mukherji 2014b). Despite these substantial challeng-
es to growth and well-being, however, populous, large and economically 
dynamic India has assumed a significant role in shaping global governance. 
India is the world’s third largest economy in terms of purchasing power pari-
ty and its growth rate is among the highest in the BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, 
China and South Africa).1 The country’s growth rate even surpassed China’s. 
This is significant, even though China’s historic most rapid growth known to 
mankind has produced a substantially larger economic pie.2 What is more 
interesting is that India’s growth is driven to a greater extent by its inter-
1 See The World Bank, World Development Indicators (2017). Date accessed: 6.7.2018
http://databank.worldbank.org/data/download/GDP_PPP.pdf
2 Ibid.
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nal rather than the global economy compared with China’s.3 India’s growth 
forces us to think that rapid economic growth is possible in a post-colonial 
and diverse liberal democracy – very different from the standard narratives 
of rapid economic growth in East Asia.4 This implies that we need to explore 
how a liberal democracy such as India sometimes transcends clientelistic 
politics that characterized dismal rates of growth (Bardhan 1984).
Concerned about miserable levels of citizen well-being, the country has 
launched one of the world’s largest employment guarantee schemes, as 
part of a rights-based approach to development that includes the right to 
work, education, and forests rights, among others. Growth with redistribu-
tion is making an impact on India’s poverty rate (Markussen, 2011; Maio-
rano, 2014; Mukherji, 2014; Klonner and Oldiges, 2014; Muralidharan, Nie-
haus, and Sukhtankar, 2016; Mukherji and Jha, 2017).
This paper presents a way of thinking about the mechanisms of citizen-
friendly governance in a democracy, where patronage-based clientelism is 
rampant. We begin with a review of the literature on clientelism. This will 
tell us a great deal about the pathologies of governance in India and it will 
make clear why the glass of India’s development is half empty. 
We then turn to the issue of governance. For example, how did India 
govern its rapid economic growth? How did states like undivided Andhra 
Pradesh implement the right to work and successfully transfer resources to 
the poor?
Thereupon, I present a tipping point model to suggest that ideas within 
the state matter for understanding how the Indian state develops the capac-
ity to govern in a citizen-friendly manner. We demonstrate that ideas within 
the state in India evolve as a result of bureaucratic puzzling and political pow-
ering to reach a tipping mark. When politics and technocracy point largely in 
the direction of a certain policy paradigm, and an ideational threshold has 
been reached, the state develops the capacity to deliver for reasons largely 
3 Trade to GDP ratio (Trade % of GDP) in China is 38 in 2017 whereas this rate in India is 41. See 
The World Bank, World Development Indicators (2017). Date accessed: 6.7.2018. These figures 
are different from the conventional wisdom, which is in the text.
https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NE.TRD.GNFS.ZS
4 For the difference between India and East Asia see Herring (1999) and Mukherji (2016).
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internal to the state. This is the story of gradual path-dependent economic 
change.
Clientelism and the Pathologies of Democracy 
Let us consider the powerful view that India is merely a procedural democ-
racy. The democratic failure to serve the citizen has been described by the 
term clientelism. Clientelism is based on patron-client relations where elec-
toral outcomes can result from ethnic or class based populism that does not 
serve all citizens impartially. Clientelism occurs when people trade votes for 
particularistic favors (Wilkinson, 2007; Hicken, 2011). The first form of cli-
entelism has an ethnic basis in India. Oftentimes, citizens vote on the basis 
of the age-old ascriptive Indian institution – caste. Kanchan Chandra, for ex-
ample, argued that the poor and most oppressed Dalit voters voted for the 
Dalit-Chamar caste based Bahujan Samaj Party (BSP) in Uttar Pradesh not 
because the party would uplift the socially and economically marginalized 
groups. They voted to feel more secure with their own caste or ethnic group 
in prominent positions of leadership. Ethnic voting for Chandra becomes 
rational because the marginalized Dalit population felt comfortable with a 
Dalit party in the absence of other candidate information in a predatory so-
cial system. The Congress Party had earlier provided representation to Dalits 
but the BSP was a Dalit party that gave representation to upper caste groups 
as well. The tables had clearly turned (Chandra, 2004).5 Another scholar ar-
gued that the rise of backward caste groups in the poverty-stricken state of 
Bihar, though considered a governance failure for investment and growth, 
actually led to a general reduction in poverty, even though the substantial 
benefit went to one particular powerful backward caste group, the Yadavs. 
India has experienced a silent democratic revolution, where the hegemony 
of the upper castes is challenged by the numerous backward and most de-
pressed caste groups (Witsoe, 2013).
The second form of clientelism has a class basis. Pranab Bardhan and 
Ashutosh Varshney contended that interest-based coalitions in India such 
5 On the ethnography of clientelism in India see Piliavsky (2014).
South Asia Institute
Papers
Issue 2 2018
South Asia Institute
www.sai.uni-heidelberg.de
Rahul Mukherji: Governing India
5
as powerful farmers, industrialists and professionals have a stake in regres-
sive and fiscally unsustainable policies such as free electricity to farmers, no 
agriculture tax, subsidies for unproductive industrialists and professionals, 
not because these benefit the citizenry at large (Bardhan, 1984; Varshney, 
1998a; Mukherji, 2007; Murali, 2017). These subsidies were accorded to 
strong and powerful voting coalitions. The state in India, unlike East Asia, 
had failed in infrastructure provision and growth because it splurged re-
sources on subsidies to powerful constituencies rather than investing in 
productive resources. 
Such is the power of caste or class-based conceptions of policies and 
electoral outcomes in India that scholars were really puzzled by the big-
bang economic reforms of 1991. Why did India embrace globalization and 
greater private sector orientation when political scientists and economists 
had largely theorised India as a “caged tiger”? One scholar argued that 
these changes were due to pressures from the business class (Pedersen, 
2000). Another argued that these changes could only be initiated by stealth. 
Policy-makers pretended as if old policies were being continued when they 
were really changing the policy paradigm on the ground (Jenkins, 1999). 
Both these arguments did not support a democratic process. Others just 
described the changes as the result of an elite revolt, without properly con-
ceptualizing the nature of that elite (Kohli, 2012; Corbridge, Harriss and Jef-
frey, 2013).
There is also a third form of clientelism in the Indian context. Historian 
Partha Chatterjee argued that India lives in a political rather than a consti-
tutional civil society. Politicians and bureaucrats afford citizens some rights, 
but not by making constitutional provisions to safeguard them. Rather they 
look in the other direction when citizens grab basic amenities such as hous-
ing and spaces for selling by illegal means. Poor people vote more often 
than the rich, so it is important to make these illegal exceptions to garner 
the vote. Even this logic of governance is clientelistic – the state acts to help 
the ruling party remain in power rather than benefit the citizenry at large 
(Chatterjee, 2011).
Clientelism is a kind of populism based on caste, class and other narrow 
interest group pressures. Clientelism-based explanations reveal why India 
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lacks the capacity to grow and serve the poor. Scholars therefore need to 
turn their gaze to other explanations for exploring the roots of rapid eco-
nomic growth and poverty alleviation. Clientelistic politics tells us why the 
glass of India’s development is half empty. If we wish to explore why it is half 
full as well, we need to pursue another explanatory path.   
The Governance Literature
How did the Indian state develop the capacity to govern? India’s consolida-
tion as a democracy and its rapid economic growth in the new millennium, 
has spurred scholarship on governance. Several arguments have been pro-
posed in this regard. Scholars such as Atul Kohli, Pradeep Chhibber and Irfan 
Nooruddin have argued, for example, that the nature of the party in power 
mattered for the provisioning of public goods. Kohli (1987) contended the 
Communist Party of India – Marxist, with a pro-poor social base and coher-
ent ideology, was much better positioned to launch land reforms in West 
Bengal than was the centre-left Congress Party in the province of Karna-
taka. Chhibber and Nooruddin proposed a different conjecture. Two-party 
competition was more likely to engender public goods rather than a contest 
among many parties. Bi-polar competition was likely to garner overarching 
interests rather than a large number of parties each serving a small voter 
base (Chhibber and Nooruddin, 2004).
Parties oftentimes worked indirectly with non-governmental organiza-
tions (NGOs) to serve citizens. It has been contended that the BJP was able 
to reconcile its upper caste social base with lower caste voters because 
some NGOs favoring the BJP but seemingly independent of it, provided 
higher quality of health and education services than the ones provided by 
the government. The NGOs would seemingly work as non-party organiza-
tions. Closer to the elections, however, these NGOs would use their subtle 
persuasive skills to persuade the lower caste, lower class and tribal voters to 
vote for the BJP. This is how the BJP could reconcile their upper caste sup-
port base with votes from the deprived castes and classes as well (Thachil, 
2014).
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Another scholar argued for the signficance of dense party networks after 
comparing Jaipur and Bhopal. Where party networks were dense, slums 
were better served by politicians than where party networks were scarce. 
When parties realised that there were potentially poor and supportive vot-
ers, they afforded dense party networks with efficient party workers. These 
areas enjoyed better public amenities such as roads and sanitation than 
those lacking such networks (Auerbach, 2016).
Local intermediaries and their contacts can also engender citizen con-
cern. Local leaders often belonging to a lower social strata and with smaller 
land-holdings than the erstwhile elite, have emerged as facilitators of devel-
opment because they possess information and contacts. These local inter-
mediaries were able to bring projects to villages from the district headquar-
ters, often playing a substantial role in assuaging grassroots demands. It was 
because of these elites – for example “gaon ke neta” (village leaders) – that 
modernization theory’s worst predictions were not realized in India. India 
was a country with increasing and diverse social demands that needed to be 
met in the context of limited institutionalization. Local leaders, according to 
some, played a signal role in ensuring that these demands did not become 
too burdensome for the state to manage (Krishna, 2007; Mitra, 1991; Jha, 
2018a). Kruks-Wisner (2018) contended that rural citizens who travelled 
more widely and were extensively networked demanded more services 
compared with those who lived within villages and were less networked.
Some scholars have argued for the agency of political leaders as well for 
producing successful policies. Prime Minister Rao’s biography stresses his 
role in the reforms of 1991 (Sitapati, 2016). There is also a substantial litera-
ture on chief ministers as CEOs that demonstrates why economic reforms 
succeeded in some states and not others. State-level chief ministers accord-
ing to this account played an important role in advancing growth and wel-
fare. According to this view, Chandrababu Naidu was able to guide Andhra 
Pradesh from a backward state to one that became well known for infor-
mation technology – one that invited substantial Indian and foreign inves-
tors to Hyderabad’s Hi-Tech City (Rudolph and Rudolph, 2007). Similar argu-
ments have been made less persuasively for welfare policies as well. Jenkins 
and Manor, for example, argue that implementation of the right to work in 
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Madhya Pradesh and Rajasthan owed a great deal to the agency of the chief 
minister (Jenkins and Manor, 2017). 
The Puzzle
There is substantial scholarship around the pathologies of governance or 
the lack of citizen orientation in India. These arguments are important for 
understanding why India remains mired in poverty and infrastructural bot-
tlenecks. These theoretical frameworks, however, are unable to explain why 
India has consolidated itself as a plural democracy – a country that was 
known for the Hindu rate of growth, an adage where the word Hindu was 
meant to characterise laziness and incapacity. Moreover, afflicted by caste 
and powerful interest groups such as capitalists, commercial farmers and 
professionals, India was supposed to be locked in low levels of human well-
being as well. Democracy, it seemed, could not be married with well-being 
in India.
The status quo of a closed economy favouring the dominant coalition 
described above has been transcended to some extent. India has globalized 
substantially. A country that had all but banished foreign investment till 
1991, now garners more investment than China in a typical year. India has 
afforded freedoms to entrepreneurs and state-level governments. Competi-
tion has driven down prices. India has one among the cheapest mobile call 
rates. How could a liberal democracy like India deal with powerful social 
actors ranged against the promotion of domestic and global competition?
Human development in India has also evolved over the years. Undivided 
Andhra Pradesh’s capacity to implement the most successful right to work 
programme with the Congress Party in power around 2005 is puzzling for 
the above explanations. There is a powerful constituency of scholars who 
maintain that the rights based approach embodied in programs like the Ma-
hatma Gandhi National Rural Employment Guarantee Scheme, did make a 
dent on Indian poverty.6
6 See for example: Markussen, 2011; Maiorano, 2014; Mukherji, 2014; Klonner and Oldiges, 
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Andhra Pradesh’s spectacular success is puzzling for the conjectures dis-
cussed above. First, the landed classes in Andhra Pradesh have been histori-
cally very powerful – one of the reasons why the communists, though re-
spected, could not rule the state (Srinivasulu, 2002; Elliott, 2016; Harrison, 
1956; Bernstorff, 1973; Sankaran, 1996). The Congress Party was in power 
when MGNREGS was launched in 2005. In CPIM-ruled West Bengal, on the 
other hand, the program was challenged by farmers who needed cheap 
labor. The CPIM, you will recall, has been praised for launching the most 
successful land reforms in West Bengal in 1977 (Kohli 1987). Second, the 
Congress’s farmer support base ensured that other Congress governments 
such as the ones in Maharashtra or Jharkhand were not so spectacularly 
successful in implementing the right to work. An exclusively party-driven 
explanation therefore has its limitations. Fourth, dense-party networks can-
not explain a macro level outcome at the level of the entire state. Last but 
not least, successful implementation of the rights-based approach weakens 
the political society argument. If the state guarantees work to citizens, it no 
longer needs to be conducted illegally by those who deserve work and do 
not get it.
I will in the following section describe another approach to state-capacity 
building by highlighting two important cases – the first is India’s transition 
to globalization and greater private sector orientation; and the second, the 
successful implementation of the right to work in Andhra Pradesh.
The Approach   
How the state thinks is significant for governance (Mukherji, 2014a; Mukher-
ji, 2014b; Mukherji and Jha, 2017; Jha, 2018b). This is a neglected area of 
theorizing in Indian and comparative politics and development. We find that 
bureaucrats and technocrats are incessantly puzzling and powering about 
policy. A lot of this puzzling occurs within an organization that Max Weber 
famously described as the bureaucracy made up of permanent professional 
2014; Muralidharan, Niehaus, and Sukhtankar, 2016; Mukherji and Jha, 2017.
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experts with assured salaries and job guarantees. Job permanence and ex-
pertise are two characteristics that endow the bureaucracy with the ability 
to puzzle and think about how policies should be experimented and how 
they should evolve7. The relationship between the technocrat or bureaucrat 
and politician is very important for understanding both how the state thinks 
and evolves the capacity to act.
Ideas Matter
Bureaucracies learn from experiments and ideas the world over. How these 
ideas are implemented, however, depends on how this learning is internal-
ized. When the US implemented Keynesian policies during the great depres-
sion, this policy paradigm was undoubtedly imported from Britain. Keynes 
had developed a powerful framework for governing macro-economic man-
agement in Cambridge, England. Despite this import, the US substantially 
prior to Britain became the first country to give shape to these policies ideas 
as a governance framework that stressed that markets fail and that employ-
ment may have to be artificially created by the state. Keynesianisms travel 
back to Europe as a policy paradigm that occurred in the aftermath of World 
War II, when Europe was devastated and the US was flushed with funds. 
This travel of Keynesianism to Europe via programs such as the Marshall 
Plan subsequently entrenched Keynesian ideas in many European bureau-
cracies (Hirschman, 1989; Blyth, 2002). In a similar vein, Hugh Heclo found 
that welfare programs in Britain and Sweden had little to do with political 
variables such as party ideology or competition and more with how bureau-
crats pursued these political agendas with pro-labor and conservative par-
ties (Heclo, 1974). Peter Hall argued that neo-liberal ideas in the UK were 
born within the Treasury and these ideas preceded the arrival of Margaret 
Thatcher as Prime Minister (Hall, 1993). When technocrats met Margaret 
Thatcher the result was the entrenchment of monetarism. 
Similarly, the rise of neo-liberal market orientation in the West had a lot 
7 On “puzzling and powering”, see Heclo (1974); Hall (1993).
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to do with the economics literature that argued persuasively that over-reg-
ulation had the effect of rent-seeking industrialization. Regulation rather 
than directing investments towards developmental agendas was being used 
to favour certain constituencies in return for rents or bribes. The parallel 
literature on rent-seeking in the industrialized and less developed world be-
gan to suggest that regulation should be reduced and markets should play 
a greater role in furthering economic growth and human well-being. These 
economic ideas subsequently had a powerful impact on the World Bank, 
the International Monetary Fund and developing countries (Stigler, 1971; 
Derthick and Quirk, 1985).
Ideas and the Indian State
Can we infer, therefore, that ideas merely diffuse and produce policies? How 
technocrats think and win political support for ideas that evolve is impor-
tant for understanding how India moves. A few examples will belabour the 
point. Jawaharlal Nehru, India’s first prime minister, was impressed both by 
Soviet Planning and by Mao’s experiments. In fact, India’s Second Five-Year 
Plan was influenced by a Soviet experiment of 1928 (Hansen, 1966; Frankel, 
2005)8. The Second Five Year Plan was also the work of technocrats such 
as Mahalanobis and I G Patel. Nehru needed technocrats to understand 
the nature of the Indian economic problem and ways to escape the decline 
that India had suffered during colonial rule. The father of Indian planning 
P C Mahalanobis not only founded Indian planning, he also founded the 
world-renowned Indian Statistical Institute, where economists across the 
ideological spectrum ranging from Maurice Dobb and Oscar Lange to Milton 
Friedman were invited to reflect on India’s problems. The Planning Commis-
sion of India was thus founded within the Indian Statistical Institute, which 
has sustained a high reputation for scholarship. Despite influences from 
the world over, India’s mixed economy was neither Soviet nor Chinese style 
planning (Patel, 2004). Neither did it promote entrepreneurship like the US 
8 On ideological contestations, see Kudaisya (2009).
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nor was it British in outlook. India opted for liberal democracy with property 
rights, where private entrepreneurship was stringently regulated but never 
abolished.    
Another example will demonstrate the importance of how the Indian 
state thinks. The country faced a severe balance of payments crisis owing to 
food shortages in 1966. India had become heavily dependent on subsidised 
US’s Public Law (PL)-480 supervised food-grains. The US was impressed with 
Indian planning in the early years and wanted to showcase India’s democ-
racy as a successful developmental experiment, especially in relation to 
communist China in the late 1950s. Consequently, India was flushed with 
US aid between 1957 and 1963. Given its status as a non-aligned country 
both the US and the USSR were competing to help India industrialize. These 
funds were used largely to promote heavy capital intensive industrialization 
to the detriment of Indian agriculture. It was opined that capital intensive 
industrialization was the key to India’s catch-up with the industrialized West 
(Muirhead, 2005).
Agriculture was relegated to the background. It was assumed that or-
ganizational changes such as land reforms and the cooperatives movement 
would ensure food security. When the monsoons failed, the US PL-480 
wheat came to India’s rescue. India did not suffer a famine as did China in 
the 1960s, largely because of the support from the US (Paarlberg, 1985; 
Varshney, 1998b; Frankel, 2005).
This approach changed when President Lyndon Johnson came to power 
in 1963 after the assassination of President Kennedy. The US government 
and the World Bank turned sceptical about Indian planning. When India 
suffered a severe food shortage in 1966, unavailability of imported non-
subsidized food-grains would have halted India’s planned development. 
President Johnson and the World Bank under George Woods now wished to 
coerce India into a private sector-friendly, export-oriented economic strat-
egy. The most famous condition for sending US food-grains to India was 
to devalue the Indian Rupee. Currency devaluation increases the price of 
imports and reduces the price of exports. It was opined that devaluation 
would discourage imports and increase the country’s capacity to buy im-
ports with exports.
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Powerful Indian technocrats such as I G Patel and L K Jha held exactly the op-
posite view. Large parts of the Indian technocracy and the political class felt 
that this was an imperial command of the US that should not be respected. 
Prime Minister Indira Gandhi consulted her technocrats and momentarily 
devalued the India Rupee to ensure that US shipments arrived as expected. 
This led to a thunderous anti-American uproar in the Indian Parliament. 
India’s policy response was to defy American goals at a time when the 
technocrats and the political class disagreed. The majority of the techno-
crats had no faith in the export-led model of growth that became popular 
after the East Asian growth story. When the balance of payments situation 
became comfortable by 1967, India moved in exactly the opposite direction. 
India became even more closed to the world, and large scale private en-
trepreneurship was regulated more stringently than ever before after 1967 
(Bhagwati and Srinivasan, 1975; Denoon, 1986).9 
The moral of the story was that India is a stubborn country that thinks 
right or wrong but remains quite pig-headed about it.
The Tipping Point
I have argued that India follows an evolutionary tipping point model of in-
stitutional and economic change. A tipping point has some salient charac-
teristics. It resembles the earthquake model of change. Changes are evolu-
tionary, gradual and largely endogenous. Changes continue to evolve over a 
period of time till they reach a threshold. What appears to be a momentous 
change resembles an earthquake. When centuries of tectonic movements 
under the earth’s crust makes the tectonic plates hit hard against each oth-
er, people on the surface often get devastated. What we observe as a symp-
tom (earthquake) appears drastic, but it is the result of centuries of gradual 
movement. Meteorologists, even though they cannot exactly predict an 
earthquake, are aware of vulnerable points because they have been observ-
ing seismic activity over decades. They know which parts of the earth are 
9 Mukherji 2014a, chapter 2.
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unlikely to experience an earthquake and where people should be careful.
How then can we locate a tipping point in social life like the meteor-
ologist? A tipping point must have the following characteristics. First, we 
should be able to observe small scale changes that have accumulated over 
a period of time. These changes may not be clear to a casual observer but 
they should be clear to anyone who has studied an institutional path care-
fully through a particular policy trajectory. These are slow-moving and al-
most invisible processes to the casual observer. There should be substantial 
difference between the institutions and policies that evolved gradually and 
what occurred when the policy earthquake changed the course of history. 
This is substantially a story of gradual endogenous change (Pierson, 2004; 
Capoccia and Kelemen, 2007).10
We hold that the momentous economic reforms of 1991 and the suc-
cess of the right to work programme in Andhra Pradesh, each constituted 
a tipping point. In both cases, the state in India found the capacity to deal 
with powerful groups ranged against the new set of institutions and poli-
cies. When the state was resolute and technocrats found political will, it 
could change course, building over decades of thinking and puzzling over 
past policies. What is also germane to the tipping point model is that poli-
tics in democracy meets technocrats – and technocrats cannot just func-
tion like autocrats. We view the state as an arena where policy ideas have 
a structural character rather than merely being the will of some technocrat 
or politician.
India’s Globalization
I have argued that the reforms of 1991 were not the result merely of a bal-
ance of payments crisis that occurred in 1991. After all, if financial crisis 
was to be the reason, reforms could have occurred in 1966 as well. I have 
described above the considerable pressure from the US and the World Bank 
that had paradoxically led India in a direction quite opposite to embracing 
the global economy. 
10 Mukherji 2014a, 23-33.
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Why then did the shift in policy paradigm, embracing an Indian style of glo-
balization and unleashing entrepreneurial energies, occur in 1991? India 
had reached a tipping point in technocratic and policy evolution by 1991 – 
having critically examined autarkic policies and having experimented with 
new ones since the mid-1970s. Significant reports of the Government of 
India criticised the closed economy model for being overregulated and inef-
ficient. The public sector was supposed to acquire the commanding heights 
but it was inefficient and consequently an unsustainable loss to the national 
exchequer. The overregulated private sector had become a rent-seeking 
racket. I G Patel, the technocrat who drafted the second Five-Year Plan, as 
Director of the London School of Economics lamented in his famous Kings-
ley Martin Lecture at Cambridge University in the mid-1980s that they had 
no idea that regulated industrialization would become a rent-seeking racket 
between the politicians, bureaucrats and entrepreneurs. Turkey and India 
were two countries that singularly inspired the economic literature on the 
pathologies of import substitution famously known as rent-seeking indus-
trialization (Bhagwati and Desai 1970; Krueger 1974). Technocrats and their 
reports from the mid-1970s therefore argued for freeing the economy of 
controls, promoting trade and unleashing the potential of the private sector 
(Mukherji 2014a, 66-69).
Gradually policy change ensued in the 1980s. The freedoms given to In-
dian entrepreneurs were enhanced. The Indian Rupee was gradually dereg-
ulated. The pace of change, however, resembled the tipping point model 
before the system tips. These changes were so gradual that political opposi-
tion to reforms remained muted.
Then came the balance of payments crisis of 1991. Montek Singh Ahlu-
walia, one of the chief technocrats, narrated this story. Ahluwalia and Prime 
Minster V P Singh visited Malaysia in 1990. So impressed was Prime Minister 
Singh with the economic development of Malaysia that he requested Ahlu-
walia to write a confidential memo regarding how India could aspire to the 
Malaysian levels of development. That confidential memo of Mr. Ahluwalia 
in 1990 formed the basis of India’s economic reforms. India’s technocrats 
knew what had to be done. There was substantial political will building over 
gradual policy experiments (Mukherji 2014a, 81).
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The balance of payments crisis of 1991 was like the cycle that crosses a 
bridge about to collapse. The external shock was no greater in magnitude 
than the oil shocks but India had overspent beyond its means and commer-
cial lenders were unwilling to lend in 1991. The technocrats knew what was 
needed. 1991 was not 1966. There were substantial areas of agreement be-
tween the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the Indian government. 
Both were convinced that devaluation, globalization and de-regulation were 
absolutely essential for the Indian economy to take off.
Prime Minister Rao and Finance Minister Dr Manmohan Singh formed a 
formidable political and technocratic team on the eve of the reforms.
Rao was an experienced and erudite statesman who like Jawaharlal Nehru 
understood the need for technocrats at the very time when the Cold War 
had ended and India was embroiled in another financial crisis. The finance 
minister who was the leader of the economic team was a respected econo-
mist who had served in all the major economic policy positions including 
the Governorship of the Reserve Bank of India in the 1980s.
Not only was he part of the incremental changes of the 1980s, he was the 
one economist who had written a brilliant doctoral dissertation at Oxford in 
1962, arguing that devaluation was good for India (Singh 1964). He was the 
first Indian economist to systematically make this point. Such was the acuity 
of his judgement that Nobel Laureate Amartya Sen wrote an essay in Singh’s 
honour, pointing out that Singh was able to see merit in devaluation even 
when Sen did not. Not only did he see merit, his research systematically 
demonstrated how devaluation could solve India’s foreign exchange prob-
lem. Singh was therefore far ahead of his times. He would lead a team of 
technocrats, which included Ahluwalia and other brilliant economists who 
had experimented with reforms in the 1980s (Sen 1998, 81).
The multilateral agencies acknowledged what had been achieved in the 
1980s. India and the IMF signed an unusually heterodox programme. The 
IMF generally dictates, and countries like Argentina and Pakistan have never 
recovered. IMF is known to be a bad doctor for solving economic problems. 
India, on the other hand, was at a tipping point. The political and techno-
cratic conviction was resolute. This allowed the Indian state to negotiate a 
rather unusual programme. Labor laws were not amended. There was hard-
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ly any privatization of the public sector. Government spending was also not 
reduced drastically beyond the first year. The fiscal responsibility act was 
enacted many years later when the IMF was no longer involved with India.
The Indian state was able to deploy dependence on the IMF to globalize 
the economy and promote entrepreneurship. The Rupee was devalued in 
July 1991. The budget of July 24 1991 changed the course of India’s eco-
nomic history. Industrial licensing was abolished. This meant that the state 
would no longer interfere in simple entrepreneurial decisions. India’s fa-
mous rent-seeking state renounced a variety of controls. Second, tariffs 
were reduced substantially. Third, foreign investment, which was less than 
worth $200 million in all, was sought aggressively. It is these reforms that 
tipped in 1991 that have produced entrepreneurship and growth, building 
on India’s entrepreneurial talent that had lain dormant for many decades.  
The crisis was used effectively to deal with the interest groups that would 
oppose reforms. The vast majority of influential Indian industrialists, for ex-
ample, would oppose the reform process. Large and powerful industrialists 
were used to trade protection. Devaluation would make their imports more 
expensive. Government controls favoured a small group of powerful indus-
trialists because they had learned to manage government. Devaluation, 
trade and foreign investment liberalization and de-regulation would make 
the business environment uncertain for established industrialists. The crisis 
helped to deal with Indian industry. It was under these circumstances that 
a relatively less well-known Confederation of Engineering Industry which 
would be rechristened as the Confederation of Indian Industry in 1992 be-
came the lead industry organization – because they were more support-
ive of government policies. No sooner had the balance of payments crisis 
ended, the Bombay Club of industrialists, a powerful group, began lobbying 
with the government to turn the clock backwards (Mukherji 2014a, 89-92).
But the political will was resolute and the institutions had changed quick-
ly and dramatically after reaching a tipping point. The clock could now not 
be turned back after the system had tipped comprehensively in a direction. 
Over time, given this direction of the state, old and new industrialists real-
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ized that the state had directed them in the direction of fortunes that they 
could never have dreamt of in the context of old institutions.11
MGNREGS in Andhra Pradesh
Implementation of the right to work in Andhra Pradesh has a similar causal 
narrative. Andhra Pradesh implemented this program more spectacularly 
than even neighbouring Tamil Nadu – a state whose reputation in economic 
growth and human well-being has been studied more extensively. Not only 
did undivided Andhra Pradesh create more jobs, the poor were targeted 
more efficiently as well. The Congress Party in Andhra Pradesh, which was 
not so successful in other states, implemented the most successful right to 
work. Neither could the Communist Party of India equal this record in West 
Bengal.12 
We need to refine our understanding regarding how political-bureaucrat-
ic synergies evolved to produce welfare in Andhra Pradesh. Our research 
suggests that Andhra Pradesh created a cadre of bureaucrats in rural devel-
opment who developed a passion for serving the poor. These civil servants 
working with their political masters empowered the most deprived classes 
over time. Consequently, Maoism vanished from the very state where it was 
so powerful at one time and found home in greener pastures such as Chat-
tisgarh and Jharkhand. My co-authors Hossein Zarhani, K Raju and I find that 
the state has made the transition from a need-based phase where politi-
cal bureaucratic synergies produced subsidized rice to the poor. When the 
need-based phase was found to be fiscally unsustainable, women’s self-help 
groups based on unleashing the entrepreneurial energies of poor women 
were unleashed. This successful programme was supported by the World 
Bank. Investment in women would uplift the class of socially and sexually op-
pressed citizens. We now know that the self-help groups in Andhra Pradesh 
are a success story. This experience was central to the capacity that the state 
11 These views are derived from research presented in Mukherji, 2013 and Mukherji 2014a. 
12 My views on Andhra Pradesh are based on Markussen, 2011; Maiorano 2014; Klonner and 
Oldiges, 2014; Muralidharan, Niehaus, and Sukhtankar, 2016; Mukherji and Jha, 2017.
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enjoyed on the eve of unleashing the right to work in the state. The state 
transitioned from a need-based to a growth and redistribution-based phase, 
finally moving towards a citizen-empowering phase. The state had evolved 
the technocratic capacity to implement the right to work (Mukherji, Zarhani 
and Raju 2018).
Let us see why technocratic conviction is important. Granting a right does 
not mean that this right is implemented. Communist-ruled West Bengal and 
Congress-ruled states such a Maharashtra and Jharkhand did not take this 
matter so seriously. Our research suggests that the political will favouring 
the implementation of the right to work had a lot to do with bureaucratic-
political interactions. The bureaucracy was able to convince the chief min-
ister that this programme would help the poor, as well as, win him elec-
tions. Political bureaucratic synergies had reached a tipping point in Andhra 
Pradesh that had equipped it for implementing a radical programme.
There was substantial political opposition to programme implementation 
arising from the politically powerful lobby of rich farmers and construction 
companies. Convincing chief minister Y S R Reddy meant that the techno-
crats would credibly argue that with political will, it would be possible to 
insulate the programme from its powerful opponents. This required the De-
partment of Rural Development to use funds from the British Department 
for International Development to strategize a plan that would insulate the 
programme from its powerful adversaries. The strategy they devised was 
neither known to the World Bank nor the DFID. This was a uniquely Indi-
an solution to a problem. It was only when the powerful arguments were 
presented to the chief minister that he agreed to insulate the programme 
from its adversaries – famously calling it his Ayappa programme after the 
famous temple in Kerala. Reddy assured the technocracy that he would put 
his political weight to insulate the programme, despite substantial opposi-
tion within the Cabinet (Mukherji and Jha 2017, 55).
The implementation had three strategic characteristics. First, India’s fa-
mous village governments would be circumvented. Rural employment pro-
grammes would be discussed within the village but a rural civil servant – 
field assistant – would bring the project to the village. The field assistant 
would organize workers. And, payments would be made directly to the poor 
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without any intervention of the village head. The implementation agreed 
with Ambedkar’s vision. It is well known that Dr. Ambedkar, the chairman of 
the drafting committee of the Indian constitution and himself a Dalit, had 
argued that Indian village was the den of caste hierarchy; Gandhi, the father 
of the Indian national movement, on the other hand, had reposed greater 
faith in village-level decentralization (Mukherji and Jha 2017, 56).
Second, Tata Consultancy Services provided a transactions software free 
of cost. This software would track where the cash came from and where it 
went. The cash was supposed to come from the Central government and go 
to the worker. It was this governance innovation that lead to the opening 
of a large number of postal and bank accounts in Andhra Pradesh so that 
wages could be delivered directly to the worker. The launching of the now 
famous universal identity cards and bank accounts for every Indian, a pro-
ject that was conceived by the Congress Party and finally launched by Prime 
Minister Modi’s government, had its roots in this experiment conducted in 
Andhra Pradesh (Mukherji and Jha 2017, 56).
Finally, and most pertinently, state-society synergies engendered the 
creation of the Society for Social Audit, Accountability and Transparency 
(SSAAT) which is designed to bring society back into the state. The Depart-
ment of Rural Development created a regulator that would monitor corrup-
tion. It experimented village-level public hearings with NGOs such as Maz-
door Kisan Shakti Sangathan (MKSS) and Action Aid. Initially, NGOs were 
even tried out as organizations that could monitor corruption by conducting 
public hearings. These experiments revealed that the government needed a 
standardized regulator. The result: state-society synergy. SSAAT was created 
with funds from the Central Government’s Mahatma Gandhi National Rural 
Employment Guarantee Scheme (MGNREGS). The Chair of the Governing 
Board was the Principal Secretary of Rural Development of the Government 
of Andhra Pradesh. But its Director Sowmya Kidambi was a social activist 
trained by MKSS. She was a consultant and not a government employee. 
On SSAAT’s governing board sat eminent social activists such as Aruna Roy, 
Nikhil Dey and Harsh Mander. The success of SSAAT has depended a great 
deal on how technologies of accountability and transparency tried out by 
NGOs were standardized within the state.
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SSAAT’s credentials are impeccable. The ethnographic work conducted by 
my colleague Himanshu Jha and myself revealed that the Social Audit Of-
fice’s data is precise. It can track corruption very efficiently, even though it 
cannot always act. SSAAT now deals with non-MGNREGS projects as well, 
and has earned the adulation of the Comptroller and Auditor General of 
India (Mukherji and Jha 2017, 56-58).
What do we know and need to know?
The rich literature on clientelism has revealed a great deal about the pathol-
ogies of governance in India. Indeed, India’s economic growth is matched 
with rising inequalities and low levels of human development. Despite these 
pathologies, India’s growth rate and initiatives to uplift the poor seem to 
suggest that this is a sleeping giant just awakened. This is a chaotic rise – In-
dia’s streets are filled with potholes and the cities are getting more polluted 
than ever. You cannot remove the poor from the slums beside the Sahar 
International Airport adjoining Mumbai. So chaotic and diverse is India that 
you can easily go back with the impression that the state in an unusual na-
tion has lost all of seventy years of post-colonial development. A lot of the 
literature will tell why.
We know much less about how India moves despite these problems. In-
dia is unique in the annals of history to have begun a post-colonial trajectory 
with such diversity as a poverty stricken liberal democracy. It therefore takes 
much greater effort to create a consensus within such a large and diverse 
society. This happens slowly after a lot of political-bureaucratic powering 
and puzzling – often change takes the form of a tipping point when debating 
over policy reaches a threshold.
I have described this puzzling and powering towards a tipping point in two 
arenas of public policy and institutional change – India’s embrace of globali-
zation and entrepreneurship as a route to development, and its embrace of 
a rights-based approach, in this case the right to work. Both constituted a 
change in the normative structure of public policies and institutions in India.
Clientelism can tell us why the glass of India’s governance is half empty. 
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Political-bureaucratic interactions leading to a tipping point, on the other 
hand, can reveal how new institutional paths get consolidated, despite sub-
stantial opposition. Puzzling and powering are very important for the state 
in the process of governance. India’s liberal democracy is not the product of 
any democratic upsurge. Neither was India’s globalization due to pressures 
from the business class nor was India’s rights-based approach to develop-
ment powered by social movements. Technocrats and politicians, often 
after taking social actors and movements into consideration, puzzled and 
powered to take India along a path that no other country has trodden.
Have we then neglected the power of ideas that have emanated from 
political-bureaucratic interactions that scholars like Max Weber (Gerth and 
Mills 1946), Hugh Heclo (1974) and Peter Hall (1993) have pointed towards? 
This research programme points to the fact that there is no one rationality 
in politics. It is important to discover how new rationalities are born in bu-
reaucracies and how they interact with politics to produce governance.
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